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Abstract
Though commanding a prominent role in political theory, deliberative democracy has also become a
mainstay of myriad other research traditions in recent years. This diffusion has been propelled along by
the notion that deliberation, properly conceived and enacted, generates many beneficial outcomes. This
article has three goals geared toward understanding whether these instrumental benefits provide us with
good reasons – beyond intrinsic ones – to be deliberative democrats. First, the proclaimed instrumental
benefits are systematized in terms of micro, meso, and macro outcomes. Second, relevant literatures are
canvassed to critically assess what we know – and what we do not know – about deliberation’s effects.
Finally, the instrumental benefits of deliberation are recast in light of the ongoing systemic turn in
deliberative theory. This article adds to our theoretical understanding of deliberation’s promises and
pitfalls, and helps practitioners identify gaps in our knowledge concerning how deliberation works and
what its wider societal implications might be.
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Although deliberative democracy is now the most vibrant area of scholarship in 
political theory (Pateman, 2012), its reach extends far beyond. Today the theory 
has a prominent role in myriad other research traditions including (but not 
limited to) international relations, comparative politics, public administration, 
law, psychology, ethics, clinical medicine, planning, policy analysis, ecological 
economics, sociology (especially social movement studies), environmental 
governance, and communication studies.  
 
At its core, deliberative democratic theory is a normative enterprise (Habermas, 
1996; Thompson, 2008). Through equal and non-coercive deliberation between 
affected individuals, law and public policy gains its legitimacy. Deliberative 
democracy embodies and discharges a fundamental duty of equal respect for the 
opinions and interests of others that ground democratic decision-making in the 
context of pervasive disagreement. Mutual reason giving, then, should be 
pursued as it forms the basis for justifying the political and social orders that 
structure our collective lives (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). On this 
widespread view, deliberative democracy has intrinsic normative worth: the 
process of deliberation is valuable for its own sake. This intrinsic normative 
core has been largely responsible for the enduring significance of deliberative 
democracy in political theory.  
 
While many proponents still seek to justify deliberative democracy on 
deontological grounds, these kinds of arguments are now routinely 
supplemented or supplanted by teleological claims. In this vein theorists and 
practitioners couch their justifications for deliberative democracy in 
consequentialist terms whereby the value of the theory lies in its ability to 
produce certain normatively desirable outcomes. It is these instrumental effects 
that have been crucial to the diffusion of deliberative democratic theory to other 
disciplines.  
 
To the extent that deliberative democracy is expected to produce desirable 
outcomes, these instrumental effects are susceptible to empirical testing. 
Although evaluating deliberative theory is complicated by a range of factors 
(Mutz, 2008), much recent scholarship has focused precisely on undertaking 
this task. Qualitative, quantitative, and experimental methods are being 
employed to test how, if at all, deliberative democracy produces valuable 
outputs. Do these empirical studies furnish us with good reasons to be 
deliberative democrats?  
 
In this article, I address this question by systematizing the existing literature on 
the instrumental effects of deliberation across three dimensions: micro-, meso-, 
and macro-level changes. I then document what we know – and what we do not 
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know – about these instrumental effects from a range of disciplines.1 The key 
finding is that we now have good evidence that deliberation produces some 
desirable consequences. In this sense, deliberative democracy has moved 
beyond being a ‘working theory’ to a normative theory with real empirical bite 
(Chambers, 2003). However, two issues remain critically underexplored. First, 
limited work has sought to break deliberation into its constitutive features and 
explore which element produces which effect. As the ‘unitary model’ of 
deliberation is questioned, this will be an important line of enquiry (Bächtiger 
& Beste, 2017; Goodin, 2005). Second, the scope conditions that promote or 
inhibit good outcomes are also underdetermined. Again, as we begin to probe 
how actors and fora can be combined across institutional landscapes to produce 
normative goods, understanding the scope conditions of deliberative benefits is 
imperative. I expound these limitations, highlight some methodological 
concerns in addressing them, and establish new directions for research. Third, I 
analyse these instrumental effects in light of the systemic turn that has 
dominated deliberative theory in recent years. I discuss how the micro, meso, 
and macro levels can fit together to provide a robust deliberative system, and 
reflect on some core tenets of this turn. The final section concludes. 
 
In sum, the article provides a systematic review of the instrumental effects of 
deliberation relevant to both theorists and practitioners. For theorists, the article 
sheds light on how deliberation might be understood at different levels, unpacks 
how the disaggregation of deliberation connects to other normative goals, and 
helps rethink the role of deliberation in wider systems. For practitioners, the 
article identifies knowledge gaps concerning how deliberation works at the 
individual, group, and societal levels, directs attention toward the scope 
conditions of deliberation, and thus suggests directions for empirical research.  
 
The Ideal of Deliberative Democracy and the (Supposed) Instrumental 
Effects 
 
There are many ways to understand the ideal of deliberative democracy. And 
befitting its prominence, supporters and critics pick up on different elements 
when utilizing the concept. Despite this diversity, it is possible to extract several 
key elements. Centrally, deliberation is a ‘talk-centric’ mode of decision-
making that eschews coercive power relations in favour of reason-giving 
(Chambers, 2003). Deliberators should ideally: foster inclusive and egalitarian 
interactions; sincerely link reasons to arguments (display justificatory 
rationale); orient claims toward the common good; frame arguments in terms of 
reasons acceptable to others (demonstrate reciprocity); show respect, and; be 
                                                          
1 I go beyond past reviews in doing so. For prior work, see Mendelberg (2002), Delli Carpini 
et al. (2004), and Ryfe (2005). For a more recent overview of the normative-empirical nexus 
in deliberative theory, see Steiner (2012).  
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prepared to change their mind when confronted by ‘better arguments’.2 To the 
extent that decisions, policies, and laws track these desiderata, democratic 
legitimacy obtains. While this normative vision is foundational to deliberative 
theory, early work in the field blended intrinsic claims with instrumental ones 
(Rosenberg, 2005). As Tali Mendelberg (2002) notes, deliberation – properly 
conceived and enacted – is not just about the process, but is also supposed “to 
produce a variety of positive democratic outcomes”.  
 
Many, if not all, prominent deliberative theorists ascribe to something like this 
view. For instance, Joshua Cohen (1989) and Jon Elster (1986) contend that 
deliberative democracy helps to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus.3 
Jane Mansbridge (1995) claims that participation in deliberation makes better 
citizens. Seyla Benhabib (1996) and Bernard Manin (1987) suggest that 
deliberation generates broad popular support even under conditions of 
disagreement. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) submit that 
deliberation produces tolerance for the views of others. Simone Chambers 
(1996) notes how deliberation enables citizens to better grasp their own 
preferences, to understand shared problems, and to shape decisions in more 
informed ways. Iris Marion Young (2002) suggests that deliberation portends 
many virtues, “such as promoting cooperation, solving collective problems, and 
furthering justice” (p. 26). And the list goes on.  
 
From these early theoretical statements, scholars have begun documenting and 
assessing the empirical validity of specific instrumental claims. Mendelberg 
(2002) reviews previous work and argues that deliberation is supposed to lead 
to enhanced empathy, enlightened preferences, the resolution of deep conflict, 
engagement in politics, faith in the basic tenets of democracy, perceived 
legitimacy of political systems, and a healthier civic life. Her review, covering 
scholarship in political theory as well as social and cognitive psychology, turns 
up mixed results for deliberation in terms of heightening cooperation, mitigating 
in-group bias, undercutting power differentials, and producing common 
understanding across difference. Yet the main result is that benefits are 
contingent on circumstance, personality, and context.  
 
Diana Mutz (2008) provides a veritable shopping list of supposed desirable 
outcomes linked to good deliberative processes. Inter alia, these include: 
awareness of oppositional arguments; tolerance; perceptions of legitimacy; 
knowledge/information gain; empathy; willingness to compromise; civic 
engagement; opinion consistency; faith in democratic institutions; consensual 
decision-making; social capital and trust, and; depth of understanding of one’s 
own views. Her main argument is that more middle-range theorizing is required 
                                                          
2 This list largely represents the unitary model or ‘Type I’ deliberation. On this nomenclature, 
see Bächtiger et al. (2010, pp. 35-6). I discuss the relationship between instrumentalism and 
Type II deliberation later. 
3 Habermas (1996) also presupposed consensus as the goal of deliberation. 
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to test these benefits systematically. In another review, Shawn Rosenberg 
(2005) argues pooling the ideas of different participants and subjecting these 
ideas to collective, reasoned deliberation is thought to yield more 
knowledgeable citizens, consistent preferences, enhanced emancipation, 
internal reflection, improved collective decisions, and the bridging of existing 
social cleavages. Similar to Mutz, his conclusion is that more empirical testing 
is needed, especially in ways sensitive to existing social and psychological 
research. 
 
As deliberative democracy reaches into new fields with different theoretical 
debates and empirical insights, the list of (alleged) instrumental benefits has 
expanded. Based on previous reviews and an inductive analysis of recent work, 
I suggest that the instrumental effects of deliberative democracy can be 
categorised across three dimensions: micro- (individual), meso- (group), and 
macro- (polity) level changes. Each level can be further disaggregated into three 
dimensions. For the micro-level, deliberation is said to structure preferences and 
shift opinions, increase knowledge, and enhance civic participatory desires. At 
the meso-level, deliberation may foster social learning, undercut polarization, 
and generate consensus. At the macro-level, deliberation can bolster popular 
support, help overcome deep divisions in society, and facilitate democratization. 
This list is not exhaustive, but it does cover deliberation’s promises: that is, the 
ability to make just and democratically-legitimate decisions.4 Turning now to 
the three dimensions, I focus on key pieces in different literatures to ensure 
depth is not substituted for breadth.  
 
The State of the Art: What Do We Know, and What Don’t We Know? 
 
Micro-Changes: Preferences and Opinions, Knowledge, and Civic 
Participation 
 
Most knowledge concerning how deliberation impacts the individual comes 
from experimental treatments in which individuals are separated into treatment 
and control groups, measured on a range of variables, engaged in a deliberative 
process (for those in the treatment), and then re-tested at the end to see if shifts 
have occurred across one or several of these variables. The main result from 
different literatures is that deliberation does drive individual-level changes. 
 
                                                          
4 Several important (alleged) benefits are not included here. Perhaps most notable is 
deliberation’s epistemic, or truth-tracking, potential. Despite this important literature, I leave 
this aside here due to epistemological concerns. Studying epistemic correctness empirically 
would necessitate a procedure-independent standard of rightness, as procedural-correctness 
would fail a standard of falsifiability. Given many situations may have several reasonably 
correct alternatives, and that sometime the best argument only emerges through deliberation, I 
simply note this as avenues for future research. 
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Perhaps the most commonly claimed benefit of deliberation is that the process 
alters peoples’ preferences and opinions in desirable ways, reflecting the 
emergence of common understanding and agreement on correct courses of 
action (Chambers, 2003). Much empirical work has focused on substantiating 
how, or even if, these benefits accrue. Initial work turned up ambivalent findings 
because opinion changes were measured at the group level which masked 
individual shifts (Barabas, 2004). However, recent literature has borne out this 
instrumental benefit by showing that deliberation does structure individual 
preferences and alter opinions in positive ways (Baccaro, Bächtiger, & Deville, 
2016; Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002; ).5 This 
follows the theoretical prediction of John Dryzek and Christian List (2003) who 
argued that deliberation could shift individual preferences toward single-
peakedness, helping to reduce cycling and therefore undercutting classic social 
choice dilemmas. This hypothesis has been confirmed in a variety of 
deliberative poll experiments (Farrar, Fishkin, Green, List, Luskin, & Paluck, 
2010; List, Luskin, Fishkin, & McLean, 2013;). While these studies are 
instructive, it often becomes difficult to pin down what drives these results: what 
element of deliberation leads to change, and what in the corpus of activity 
comprising a deliberative poll (recruitment, interviews, moderation, on-site 
deliberation, post-deliberation surveys, etc.) alters preferences in this way 
(Farrar et al., 2010). Because deliberative polls tend to measure pre- and post-
deliberative preferences, these issues are left in a ‘black box’ (Bächtiger and 
Parkinson, forthcoming).  
 
Several scholars have recognized – and sought to correct – this issue. Gerber, 
Bächtiger, Fiket, Steenbergen, & Steiner,  (2014) – exploiting the data from the 
EuroPolis deliberative poll – use the discourse quality index (DQI) to find that 
citizens are able to craft fairly sophisticated deliberative arguments by invoking 
arguments linked to common good orientation, respect, empathy and 
inquisitiveness. This does lead to stronger preference change, but the result is 
tempered by uneven distribution of deliberative capacity across demographic 
groups (most notably class and geographic origin).6 Employing evidence from 
a different minipublic in Finland, Staffan Himmelroos and Henrik Serup 
Christensen (2014) find that opinion change in deliberators comes down to 
justificatory rational, respect, and reflection (see also Baccaro et al., 2016). Sean 
Westwood (2015), in an exemplary study of a deliberative poll concerning the 
2004 US primaries, shows that justified statements aimed at persuading 
individual listeners is the strongest predictor of individual opinion change. 
                                                          
5 For a dissenting view, see Sanders (2012). Using individual-level multivariate panel data 
from the Europolis Poll he finds that opinions do shift but ‘strength of argument’ is not causal. 
However, his reliance on self-perception dilutes this result.  
6 See also Gerber, Bächtiger, Shikano, Reber, and Rohr (2016). Siu (2008) also shows that the 
ability to engage in high quality arguments does not vary across gender. Suiter, Farrell, and 
O’Malley (2016) show that opinion change is most likely in deliberators under 65 with 
median knowledge levels. 
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However, Westwood does not unpack which kind of justifications generate this 
result. For instance, we should care whether logically consistent arguments, 
those that attach to common good justifications, or those that display reciprocity 
generate the most change. 
 
A closely related strand of literature has focused on knowledge gain as a 
desirable outcome of deliberation (Barabas, 2004). The basic idea here is that 
the process exposes deliberators to new views, piques their interest, and leads 
to increased knowledge on this issue. The connections between knowledge gain 
and preference/opinion change are complex. On many accounts, knowledge 
gain is treated as an intervening variable that impacts opinions and preferences. 
As such not all studies interested in deliberation and knowledge gain treat the 
latter as a dependent variable (Sanders, 2012).7 Yet there is a substantial body 
of work that shows that knowledge gain is a by-product of deliberation. Delli 
Carpini (1997) demonstrates that deliberation enhances knowledge on that 
issue, and Cook and Jacobs (1998) found that deliberation in a forum concerning 
social security led to increased knowledge on the program and plans. Gastil 
(2008) likewise finds that participation in deliberative forums raises 
individuals’ levels of interest in the discussion topic, including how frequently 
they seek knowledge on that issue, but does not elucidate a causal mechanism 
behind this shift. Early scholarship thus turned up the conclusion that discussing 
an issue made individuals more knowledgeable about that topic, including 
deepening their own position and gaining knowledge of alternate views 
(Barabas, 2004; Rosenberg, 2005). 
 
Building upon these finding, scholars have moved toward unpacking the 
conditions under which knowledge is obtained. Farrar et al. (2010) find that 
deliberation enhances individual knowledge significantly (in the statistical 
sense) when issue salience is low: individuals have less established views and 
therefore more ‘room to move’. Andersen and Hansen (2007) – employing 
panel data from a deliberative poll on the Danish referendum to adopt the Euro 
– show that knowledge is enhanced through deliberation on the subject, but that 
initial deliberation has a stronger effect than later deliberation. This is exactly 
what scholars of path-dependence would predict, but it remains to be seen 
whether some form of arguments (justificatory, reciprocal, generalizable, etc.) 
given later in a process can undo earlier arguments that are less well constructed. 
Kimmo Grönlund and his collaborators (2010) have also looked at whether 
deliberative quality increases knowledge. They find that when groups are 
required to form a common statement at the end of deliberation, these groups 
both deliberate ‘harder’ (i.e. weighing alternate positions more) and generate 
more knowledge gains (Grönlund, Setälä, & Herne, 2010). To date, I know of 
                                                          
7 For the finding that knowledge gain is orthogonal to preference change, see Westwood 
(2015, 523). 
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no longitudinal study that seeks to understand whether deliberation generates 
longer lasting forms of knowledge gain, or through what specific mechanism.  
 
The final individual-level change brought about by deliberation involves 
enhanced desires for civic participation or engagement. This outcome was 
treated sceptically by early research in the field. Canonically Mutz (2002) found 
that exposure to more plural media increased political engagement, but 
exposure to a greater number of opposing discussions decreased willingness to 
engage in politics.8  
 
Yet other work has determined a connection between deliberation and an 
individual’s civic participatory desires. For example, Fishkin and Luskin (2005) 
found that deliberative practices enhance the skills associated with citizenship. 
Andersen and Hansen (2007) and Christensen, Himmelroos, and Grönlund 
(2017) show that deliberation increases willingness to participate in deliberative 
bodies, but may discourage participation in formal representative politics. 
Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, and Sokhey (2010), in an impressive lab-in-
the-field experiment, come to an alternate conclusion: those less interested in 
traditional politics are most likely to be motivated to engage in political 
participation after deliberation. Finally Knobloch and Gastil (2015), employing 
longitudinal survey data from two deliberative forums, find that deliberation 
makes individuals feel more capable of participation in politics and more active 
members of local communities. These authors find that face-to-face deliberation 
has stronger effects on public attitudes than internet discussion. Yet there are 
very few studies showing whether this uptick in civic desire translates in to real 
world action (Bachtiger & Parkinson, forthcoming; Minozzi, Neblo, Esterling, 
& Lazer, 2015; but see Harriger, McMillan, Buchanan, & Gusler, 2017). 
 
These micro results are strikingly similar. We now know that individual 
preferences, knowledge, and civic desires can be driven – at least in part – by 
deliberation. But several issue remain outstanding. In almost all cases, it is 
unclear what aspect of deliberation is doing the causal work: justificatory 
quality, listening and respect, reciprocity and generalizability, or some other 
aspect. Although studies on preference and opinion change have begun opening 
this black box through the use of DQI, these results are provisional. Likewise, 
almost all of these studies come from experimental conditions. As such, it is 
hard to determine whether deliberation, face-to-face contact, moderation, 
information, the survey, or some other part of the process is generating the micro 
results we see here. Taking studies ‘in to the field’ will make it more difficult 
to control for some of these variables and therefore specify the scope conditions 
of deliberative benefits. But it would also help remove some potentially 
confounding variables (such as moderation), thus enabling adjudication 
                                                          
8 It is worth noting, however, that neither exposure to media nor simple discussion qualify as 
‘deliberative’ as per theoretical stipulations.  
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between competing results (for an early attempt, see Jacquet, 2017). Moving 
forward, understanding which aspect of deliberation drive different results – and 
under what conditions – will prove critical.  
 
Meso-Changes: Social Learning, Polarization, and Consensus  
 
A closely related body of literature has focused upon how deliberation 
influences groups or collectives. Much of this work also employs experimental 
techniques, though the methodological corpus is broadening over time.  
 
A key part of this literature focuses on social learning: the ability of an actor to 
render their views understandable, denote the importance of that view, and make 
the reasons underpinning said view clear.9 Proponents typically argue that 
inclusive and authentic deliberation will lead to deeper understanding and 
appreciation of the views of others. This concept is a close cousin of empathy, 
toleration, and recognition.10 In early studies concerning the deliberative impact 
on empathy, Mendelberg (2002), in line with theories of motivated reasoning, 
suggested that linguistic intergroup bias – the privileging of arguments by 
members your own group at the expense of out-groups – is likely to undercut 
the ability of individuals to empathize. In a follow up piece, Mendelberg and 
Oleske (2000) found that discussion did not produce greater tolerance for 
opposing views nor mitigated conflict. This work suffered from a 
methodological bias, reliant upon participants’ self-assessment for measures of 
empathy.11 Recent studies, though, rely upon more objective measures. For 
instance, Siu (2008) shows that deliberation does shift opinions, but not in ways 
that reflect entrenched hierarchies, suggesting that deliberators are able to take 
seriously the views of others beyond stereotypical characterizations.  
 
Other work in deliberative theory follows this more sanguine trend, though it is 
far from conclusive (Andersen & Hansen, 2007, 543). Michael Morrell (2010), 
in a pioneering study, contends that cognitive empathy (gaining knowledge on 
the other person’s preferences and reasons for that position, juxtaposed against 
affective empathy which is knowledge of another person’s mental state) is 
driven by reciprocity. Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2014; see also Luskin, 
O'Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014) argue that deliberation acts as a buffer 
against more negative feelings towards the out-group, and demonstrate this 
finding in the context of two deliberative experiments in Belgium. These 
                                                          
9 Social learning is a ‘group-level change’ because it necessitates a dyadic relationship with 
another agent.  
10 While related, social learning is not synonymous with recognition as the former focuses on 
understanding emotions or thoughts while the latter is concerned with appreciation of identity. 
The results, however, should be of interest however to those concerned with identity politics. 
11 On this critique, see Price and Cappella (2002). For instance, we should be concerned that 
individuals feel underappreciated even if their views have been understood and given due 
consideration by others.  
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scholars argue that the quality of deliberation does not produce more tolerance. 
Finally Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä (2015) have empirically demonstrated that 
deliberating in mixed groups over immigration (i.e. people both pro and con 
immigration policy) increases outgroup empathy. Deliberation in the mixed 
group, favoured by deliberative theory, generates higher levels of empathy than 
a con group also subjected to deliberative treatment. These results provide us 
with reason to think that deliberation has some effect, but the mechanism is 
unclear. This is especially complicated by the fact that deliberation is often said 
to require other-regardingness as a procedural good, making autocorrelation an 
issue. Separating deliberation into different features would make testing social 
learning as a dependent variable more theoretically robust.  
 
Perhaps the most hotly-debated group effect of deliberation is whether the 
process leads to polarization (Farrar, Green, Green, Nickerson,  & Shewfelt, 
2009; Sunstein, 2002). In a series of publications, Cass Sunstein (2002, 2009) 
argued that a ‘law of group polarization’ would develop from collective 
deliberation: groups that begin discussing an issue together will move toward 
the extreme of that position. This occurs through two mechanisms: social 
comparison and persuasive arguments. The former works as individuals seek 
acceptance of a group and see extreme positions as the safest ‘bet’ to adopt, 
while the latter operates as groups present arguments supporting the initial 
position, thus driving the group toward the predominantly held position 
(amplified by confirmation bias).  
 
The literature on polarization – closely linked to work on enclave deliberation 
– has developed apace over the past decade. Myriad disciplines have produced 
results that group polarization does occur in many contexts. From law, Sunstein 
(2009) presents experimental evidence that groups tend to move toward the 
direction of the position initially dominating the group. In American politics, 
David Jones (2013) finds that workplaces dominated by partisan groups 
(especially Republican environments) shift toward that partisan extreme over 
time. In computer sciences and social psychology, Conover, Ratkiewicz, 
Francisco, Gonçalves, Menczer, and Flammini, (2011) use network clustering 
algorithms and manually-annotated data to study 250,000 tweets in the weeks 
leading up to the 2010 U.S. Congressional midterm. They show that Twitter 
users retweet information in ways that lead to polarization, but mention other 
users in ways that cross partisan divides.  
 
Despite these (somewhat) robust findings, these studies are largely looking at 
group interactions or discussion. They do not focus on how deliberation impacts 
polarization. In these cases, results show the opposite: during deliberation 
groups come to learn about the views of others and thus depolarize (Grönlund 
et al., 2010). This is a result supported by Landemore and Mercier (2012) who 
argue that it is only groups of strictly-like minded individuals that fail to 
deliberate properly that are likely to polarize. Alternately, when conditions of 
9








reasoning are satisfied, deliberation guards against this outcome. Likewise 
Lazer et al. (2015) have shown that participation in a deliberative event induces 
individuals to discuss the topic with those who hold different opinions in 
society, thus undercutting polarization. Finally Lindell et al. (2017) have begun 
analysing not just group shifts in terms of polarization or moderation, but 
individual changes. These scholars find that ideological factors (a left-right 
orientation) are good predictors for the polarisation or the moderation of 
opinions. Interesting these authors find that the absence of immigrants in a 
deliberation about immigration seems to cause polarization toward the extreme, 
highlighting the importance of a politics of presence (descriptive 
representation). So while some scope conditioning factors are being explored, 
much more work is needed to determine whether clear arguments, reciprocity, 
or some other deliberative virtue helps guard against polarization.  
 
Finally, early scholarship suggested that consensus was the goal of deliberation 
(Cohen, 1987). To the extent that deliberation generates single-peakedness we 
may expect that consensus results from deliberation. Over the years, however, 
this perceived benefit has been largely denounced by political theorists 
(especially difference democrats) and philosophers of language (Young, 
2002).12 It has also been suggested that consensus is only empirically plausible 
under highly stringent conditions, such as when deliberators share an underlying 
common interest and thick social bonds (such as friendship), as well as when 
the problem under discussion has an identifiable, “correct” solution (Delli 
Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Meldelberg & Okereke, 2002). Reasonable 
disagreement and heterogeneity – which pervade almost all social contexts – 
makes consensus unobtainable.  
 
Resultantly, there is now a prevalent notion that meta-consensus is a desirable 
outcome of deliberation (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006). Meta-consensus is the 
notion that post-deliberation agreement will emerge on the nature of the issue 
at hand. It is related to – though not synonymous with – the idea of 
intersubjective rationality in which deliberators come to agree on a decision for 
the same reasons. Employing data from a citizens’ jury mini-public, Niemeyer 
and Dryzek (2007) have shown that deliberation does lead to meta-consensus, 
making decision-making more tractable. Providing related evidence, Grönlund 
et al. (2010) have shown that deliberators are able to construct common 
statements on complex topics after deliberation which, in turn, leads to higher 
rates of civic competence (i.e. willingness to participate more in future). This 
finding, they argue, is evidence that meta-consensus can emerge when groups 
need to work on constructing a joint position. In slightly more demanding way, 
Wesolowska (2007) shows that the structural conditions needed to reach meta-
                                                          
12 The former because consensus risks silencing voices that do not conform to expectations of 
rational reason-giving, and the latter because of contestation over the nature of language. 
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consensus include previous common ground, positive evaluation of others’ 
claims, and reciprocity. 
 
There is now considerable evidence that deliberation produces other-
regardingness and inhibits polarization. Work linking deliberation to (meta-
)consensus lags behind. But across all three outcomes, there are very few studies 
showing what aspect (or combination of aspects) of deliberation matters most. 
As such, current studies are indicative of deliberation’s potential, but not 
conclusive. In future, unpicking what element of deliberation is effectual and 
under what conditions requires a combination of experimental and non-
experimental studies. Qualitative case studies, for instance, will be important in 
understanding whether groups in public spheres can engage in social learning, 
inhibit polarization, or generate meta-consensus. While case studies focusing 
on deliberation’s effect will be hard to undertake given the inability to control 
for non-deliberative factors (an issue of internal validity), it would greatly 
strengthen the external validity of current studies. Lab-in-the-field experiments, 
such as those run by Lazer, Sokhey, Neblo, Esterling, and Kennedy (2015), may 
well offer a useful ‘half-way house’ in this pursuit. This would allow scholars 
to test whether deliberative quality, and a wider array of latent variables, might 
matter in conditioning these outcomes in semi-controlled situations.  
 
Macro-Changes: Popular Support, Deep Divisions, and Democratization  
 
At its core, deliberative democracy is a theory of intrinsic legitimacy (Benhabib, 
1996). Despite this, many scholars claim that deliberation will instrumentally 
induce individuals to support decisions even if they disagree with the outcome, 
help mend differences across views, and ultimately promote democratization as 
laws gain stability. These virtues operate at the polity-level: generating support 
in mass publics, overcoming societal cleavages, and democratizing shared 
political structures.13 While experimental, qualitative, and quantitative research 
show promise on these fronts, results remain mixed. In line with micro and meso 
findings, there is some evidence that deliberation buttresses these outputs, but 
the precise deliberative mechanism underpinning said result remains 
understudied. 
 
Also known as sociological or perceived legitimacy, many scholars have 
suggested that deliberation will generate popular support for a decision or rule 
(Manin, 1987). That is, citizens will support – or at least comply with – more 
deliberatively-justified decisions. This essentially Habermasian contention has 
been given credence by recent research showing that participation in decision-
making drives perceived legitimacy of decision output. Peter Esaiasson and his 
colleagues, undertaking a randomized lab-in-the-field experiment with high 
                                                          
13 On the importance of polity as distinct from systems in deliberative thought, see Dryzek 
(2017). 
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school students in Sweden, find that personal involvement in decision-making 
is the strongest predictor of perceived legitimacy (Esaiasson Gilljam, & 
Persson, 2012). In another study, Denise Trabers (2013) – employing interview 
techniques – finds that participation in decision-making (especially when 
consensus is reached) generates the highest levels of perceived legitimacy for 
the decision. In one of the most direct tests of the linkage between deliberative 
democratic decision-making and perceived legitimacy of outcomes, Jenny de 
Fine Licht and her co-authors (2014) employ vignette experiments to test 
whether transparency in decision-making generates higher rates of perceived 
acceptance. The main finding from this study is that transparency in process and 
rationale enhances perceived legitimacy. In a boon for deliberative theory, these 
authors show that when decision-making approaches the deliberative ideal of 
respectful and rational argumentation, the highest rates of perceived legitimacy 
are attained.  
 
These results, however, are tempered by a study from Mikael Persson and his 
co-authors (2013) where they show that democratic procedures – direct voting 
and deliberation – both increase perceived legitimacy, though voting predicts 
for stronger effects. Additionally, Esaiasson, Persson, Gilljam, and Lindholm 
(forthcoming) report findings from twenty-seven field and vignette experiments 
on different subjects and comparative case analyses. These scholars show that 
outcome favourability – the extent to which a decision tracks an individual’s 
preferences – is a stronger predictor of decision acceptance than procedural 
fairness. But given that deliberative democrats stress the endogeneity of 
preference transformation to decision-making, this is neutral finding. These 
studies do, though, give us good reason to think that some aspects of 
deliberation are more important than others in generating popular support. 
 
Work on deeply divided societies has traditionally been agnostic or even 
oppositional to deliberation. For instance, some comparative democratization 
scholars have claimed that deliberation may stoke the embers of conflict 
(Horowitz, 1991). Alternately, consociational structures are supposed to foster 
bargaining between elites instead of involving citizens in violent agonism. 
Whether deliberation provokes or dampens conflict is an empirical question, 
however. Recent years have seen increased interest in how deliberation may 
help ethnically or otherwise divided societies overcome divisions (O’Flynn, 
2007; Ugarriza & Caluwaerts, 2014).  
 
 Early comparative work focused on how elites in divided societies could be 
encouraged to deliberate instead of merely bargain. Steiner, Bächtiger, 
Spörndli, and Steenbergen (2004) showed that strong decision rules – even in 
political systems characterized by deep disagreement – could generate 
deliberation. In a more normative vein, John Dryzek (2005) argued that divided 
societies should strive to decouple elite and public sphere deliberation to stop 
conflict over sovereign authority inhibiting dialogue between different groups. 
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Building upon this, many scholars have begun arguing that consociational 
structures should be designed with deliberative principles in mind so that 
individuals can deliberate across difference. For instance, Ian O’Flynn (2010; 
2017) seeks to imbue consociationalism with deliberative norms to generate 
conflict resolution or, more strongly, to invoke shared intentions enabling 
societal divides to be bridged. These arguments, however, are mostly normative 
or conceptual. Direct evidence that deliberation in divided societies helps 
reduce conflict is hard to come by, and many scholars have turned toward the 
literatures on enclave deliberation and political trust for instruction.  
 
Others, though, have exploited experiments in divided society for empirical 
data. Undertaking a deliberative poll in Omagh, Northern Ireland, Luskin et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that Catholics and Protestants were able to deliberate 
meaningfully, gain knowledge of opposing viewpoints, and ultimately support 
greater intermingling of ideas in policy outputs. Caluwaerts and Ugarriza 
(2014,), drawing upon nine case studies of divided societies from across the 
globe, argue that deliberation can lead to conflict resolution when institutions 
are decentralized (i.e. empower civil society) and elites promote engagement 
(i.e. lead by example). Steiner Jaramillo, Maia, and Mameli (2017), in a series 
of moderated deliberations between individuals from divided societies, find that 
rational argumentation and story-telling can sustain high levels of deliberative 
quality leading to agreement within the groups on key policy topics. Steiner’s 
study – with a focus on how different modes and types of deliberation generate 
outcomes – is indicative of the type of work needed to show not just that 
deliberation has desirable effects, but the mechanisms and contexts that are 
pivotal in these pursuits. 
 
Work on national democratization – both transition and consolidation – has 
been almost entirely insulated from discussions of deliberative democracy. As 
Dryzek (2009) notes, “the comparative study of democratization has missed 
what, to many analysts and democratic innovators, is the most important aspect 
of democracy: deliberation” (p. 1379). There is, however, an emerging literature 
that shows tentatively positive results linking deliberation in civil society to 
national democratization.  
 
Importantly, a major strand of empirical deliberative analysis has focused on 
formal state institutions critical for flourishing democracies (such as legislatures 
and courts). Steiner et al. (2004), using the DQI to analyse 4,488 speeches from 
German, Swiss, and U.S. parliamentary debates, find that deliberation can 
develop within these institutions. However, there is variation across these 
bodies: Swiss grand coalitions enhance respectful behaviour of MPs much more 
than the US Congressional rules and German Parliamentary procedures. In a 
more negative vein, Landwehr and Holzinger (2010) compare a German 
parliamentary debate to a citizen conference on embryonic stem cells and find 
that Parliamentary debate is less deliberative than the alternative. These studies, 
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though insightful, do not show a link between deliberation in formal bodies and 
the ability of a polity to sustain democratization. 
 
Some work attempts to link deliberative quality in society to the transition 
toward, and consolidation of, democratization. The clearest evidence linking 
deliberative quality in formal and informal spaces of the state to democratization 
comes from the literatures on constitutional moments. Jon Elster (1998), 
analysing the French and American experience, depicted an hourglass model of 
how public deliberation should shape constitutionalism. He argued that 
democratic stability would be best ascertained through public participation in 
initial stages with public ratification at the end, while the writing itself should 
be shielded from citizen input. This model has recently been shown limited. In 
the most comprehensive study to date linking citizen deliberation and national 
democratization, Eisenstadt, LeVan, and Maboudi (2015) analyse 138 new 
constitutions in 118 countries between 1974 and 2011. By disaggregating 
constitution making into three stages – drafting, debating, and ratification – 
these authors demonstrate that public input early in the drafting stage 
significantly increases the stability and democratic quality of the regime over 
time. Seeking support later in the process is much harder to achieve. These 
authors claim that this lends significant support to deliberative democratic 
theory, but do not directly study deliberation itself in these moments, instead 
taking inclusiveness, transparency and participation of citizens as proxies.  
 
These polity-level studies have many limitations and therefore future directions 
for research abound. Research on public support should move beyond 
experiments and draw on studies of citizen behaviour in democracies, which 
seek to understand whether individuals are more accepting of policy decisions 
when elites justify their positions deliberatively (Colombo, forthcoming). 
Studies on deep divisions have made good use of experimental minipublics in 
some contexts, but looking at truth and reconciliation commissions on the 
ground is a useful avenue. Likewise, time-series data that tracks elite 
deliberative quality vis-à-vis societal cleavages would be instructive. In terms 
of democratization, there are very few studies linking deliberative quality in 
formal institutions and civil society to national democratization. Most large-n 
datasets on national democratic quality – Freedom House or Polity IV – do not 
contain coding on deliberative indicators. This is changing, though: V-Dem, a 
new comparative and longitudinal dataset on national democratization, contains 
a range of deliberative indices. This will make it possible for future scholars to 
take up the task of examining if, how, and under what conditions deliberative 
quality in different parts of the state promote transition and consolidation of 
democracy (but see Coppedge, Gerring, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Hicken, & 
Semetko, 2011). Overall, these studies need to assess how the supposed 
instrumental benefits at the macro-level are related to different aspects of 
deliberation between citizens and elites, while also focusing on the scope 
conditions under which these benefits accrue.
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Types of studies Methodological 
concerns  
Key findings 
Micro Individual Opinions and 
preference change 
 
Experimental Deliberative polls 
dominate. No natural 
experiments, very few 
case studies or 
quantitative studies 
Strong link between deliberation and 
outcome, but still little work showing 
which element of deliberation is causal. 
Lab-in-the-field experiments and case 
studies offer promising directions 
Knowledge gain Experimental 
Civic Participation Experimental (Lab, 
lab-in-the-field) 
Meso  Group Social learning Experimental Overly reliant on 
experiments. 
Quantitative studies of 
polarization do not 
focus on deliberation  
Social learning and polarization show 
strong results for deliberation. Meta-
consensus studies are lacking. Qualitative 






Macro Polity Popular support Experimental (lab, lab-
in-the-field) 
Popular support and 
divided societies too 
reliant on experiments, 
democratization has 
too few cases or 
experimental work 
Popular support studies should draw on 
literatures on citizen competence and 
citizen compliance. Divided societies 
requires more case studies and 
quantitative work. Democratization needs 
more large-n work as datasets become 
more nuanced 
Divided societies Theoretical, 
experimental 
Democratization Qualitative and 
quantitative  
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The Priority of the System: Tying the Levels Together 
 
The key finding from the previous section is that deliberation does generate a 
swathe of beneficial outcomes, but there is variation across these effects (for a 
summary, see Table 1 above). The main frontier for research, already underway, 
is determining which aspect of deliberation does the causal work in generating 
different benefits. For instance, more work is required to isolate whether 
respect, high quality justifications (i.e. with multiple reasons connected to 
arguments), reciprocal or generalizable arguments, willingness to compromise, 
or any other feature – or combination thereof – matters most. Precisely because 
different instrumental effects may be – and likely are – generated by different 
mechanisms, this work will provide critical. This work is especially relevant as 
scholars are increasingly taking a ‘functional’ or ‘problem-driven’ approach to 
deliberation (see respectively: Bächtiger & Beste, 2017; Warren, 2017). These 
theoretical moves recognize, in one way or another, that deliberation is actually 
a composite concept comprised of many different mechanisms. This ‘non-
unitary’ view holds that the ‘right’ deliberative or otherwise democratic action 
to be invoked depends on the issue at hand: we should tailor prescription to the 
problem needing solving. In some instances we need to overcome deep 
divisions, and other times knowledge gain is crucial: as different aspects of 
deliberation may generate these results, we need to disaggregate deliberation 
and link mechanisms to outputs. Moreover, as some features of deliberation 
may work well in tandem, it is critical to begin this disaggregation process and 
see how certain features, in isolation and in tandem, are linked to different 
outcomes. While certainly complicated work, the theoretical and empirical 
importance cannot be understated.  
 
Relatedly, with some notable exceptions from micro-studies, the scope 
conditions that inhibit or enable deliberation have not been studied in depth. 
This includes thinking about how non-deliberative elements of the experimental 
approach – such as face-to-face interaction with deliberators, moderation, and 
information provision – alter outcomes. Likewise, the psychological makeup of 
participants and their backgrounds (class, gender, race, etc.) may all matter in 
the outcome produced. Finally, how deliberative events are embedded in social 
and political contexts will also likely impact whether certain benefits are 
achieved. Case studies and large-n analysis will raise the stakes in terms of the 
number of variables that bias results, but are essential in thinking about how 
deliberation operates in the ‘real world’.14  
 
However, understanding when and why to pursue these instrumental benefits 
requires deeper engagement with normative theory. Fortunately, the two 
pathways forward outlined in this article are both intertwined with the recent 
systemic turn in deliberative theory. Time is therefore ripe to assess how these 
                                                          
14 It also is essential for generating external validity for current experimental work. 
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instrumental effects may impact systemic theorizing and vice-versa. I undertake 
this task in three steps. First, I reflect upon the core normative goal of the 
systemic turn and situate my position against others in the literature. Second, I 
discuss how deliberative systems can and should make use of the empirical 
evidence marshalled in this article to combine micro, meso, and macro levels in 
this pursuit. Finally, I show how key implications of the systemic turn should 
inform future analysis of the instrumental benefits of deliberation at the three 
levels specified here.  
 
The Systemic Turn 
 
The basic premise behind the systemic turn is that deliberative democracy 
cannot be limited to formal reason-giving in hermetically-sealed fora. Instead 
deliberation should be scaled up: distributed across interconnected institutions 
in time and space. Differential institutions will play different roles in this 
systemic architecture, and individuals will be able to contribute arguments and 
reasons through a range of communicative modes in those venues. The systemic 
view, then, strives to combine the micro-element of individual deliberation with 
meso-importance of discreet fora and the macro necessity of polity-wide 
structures.  
 
This systemic turn has proven to be a fruitful line of inquiry. Its roots hark back 
(at least) to Habermas’ (1996) two-track notion of democratic societal 
legitimacy in which decision-making in empowered spaces is directed by 
deliberation within and between publics. And we now have different ways of 
assessing the democratic legitimacy of deliberative systems. In roughly 
chronological order, Robert Goodin (2005) has outlined a distributed model of 
deliberation in which different institutions play different roles in discharging 
the deliberative ideal. Carolyn Hendriks (2006) provides an integrated model of 
deliberative systems in which micro, macro, and mixed discursive spheres 
enable different representative and participatory outlets for citizens. Dryzek 
(2009) focuses on whether a system enables inclusive, authentic, and 
consequential deliberation as a metric of (democratic) legitimacy. Parkinson 
and Mansbridge (2012) look at how institutions in a systemic division of labour 
can be coupled together in ways that enable the flow of good arguments but 
inhibit co-optation (see also Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, Christiano, Fung, 
Parkinson, Thompson, & Warren, 2012). Their undergirding commitment is to 
provide a system that enables ethical, epistemic, and democratic values to 

















Normative core Key parts Relationship between parts 
Jürgen Habermas Two-track 
model 
Democratic legitimacy - 
binding will formation 





Informal opinions should be transmitted to 
formal decision-making spheres through 
elections, media, etc. 
Robert Goodin Distributed 
(or delegated) 
deliberation 
Deliberative ideals – open, 
justified validity claims, 
common good, respect, 
consensus-orientation, 
sincerity 
Institutions connected in 
a chain 
Different parts play different roles in upholding 
the deliberative ideal (i.e. features of the ideal 
are distributed along the chain) 
Carolyn Hendriks Integrated 
model 
Agency, diversity, and 
interconnectivity 
Macro, micro, and mixed 
discursive spheres 
Overlapping spheres are integrated together; 
micro decision making and macro publics are 
connected through mixed spheres 
John Dryzek Deliberative 
capacity-
building 
Inclusive, authentic, and 
consequential deliberation 




Public opinions are transmitted to empowered 
space, the latter is held accountable to the 
former. Collective decisions reflect this 
arrangement 
John Parkinson & 
Jane Mansbridge  
Deliberative 
systems 
Epistemic, ethical, and 
democratic desiderata  
Any set of 
interconnected 
institutions  
Division-of-labour emerges between the parts 
in generating epistemic, ethical, and democratic 
goodness; coupling between institutions should 
allow flow of arguments but restrict co-optation 
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These systemic views have emerged largely in response to criticisms raised 
against deliberative democracy during the 1990s and 2000s. Difference 
democrats, for example, accused deliberative scholars of focusing too heavily 
on justificatory rationale, and ignoring other modes of reason-giving (Young, 
2002) while agonists argued that a search for consensus robbed politics of its 
contestatory nature (Sanders, 1997). More deliberative-friendly researchers 
suggested that the focus on isolated fora (such as minipublics) shifted attention 
too far away from mass publics (Chambers, 2003), or that minipublics cannot 
legitimately make public policy (Lafont, 2015; Parkinson, 2004).15 The 
systemic turn tackles these criticisms directly by asking how the deliberative 
ideal of reason-giving might be compatible with different forms of 
communication, and what the appropriate space for non- or even anti-
deliberative action (protests, violence, etc.) might be (Fung, 2005). This turn 
also marks a conscious return to thinking about how mass publics can be knitted 
to binding decision making and has gravitated toward understanding how 
minipublics might be differentially utilized in broader systemic contexts for 
systemic legitimacy (Goodin & Dryzek, 2005; MacKenzie & Warren, 2012). 
 
Despite these advancements, the systemic turn has also come under heavy 
criticism. The major reproach is that adapting deliberative democracy to 
empirical ‘facts’ risks cutting loose the normative anchor of deliberation. This 
argument comes in two forms (Owen & Smith, 2015). First, there is a worry 
that the breakdown of the unitary model – and evaluations of legitimacy and 
justice at the systemic level – means that deliberative systems may actually 
entail very little deliberation. By evaluating the system as a whole, distributed 
instances of deliberation might not ever mean that the ideal of deliberative 
democracy is reached, and citizens do not ‘reason together’. Second, the 
admittance of novel forms of communication and the acceptability of non-
deliberative acts have been interpreted as an abrogation of the normative core 
of deliberative theory for which clear bounds of acceptability have not been 
specified (Bächtiger & Parkinson, forthcoming).  
 
These are importance considerations. Constructively, Owen and Smith (2015) 
stipulate two alternate ways to advance the systemic turn overcoming these 
issues, while (allegedly) being compatible with the ideal of deliberative 
democracy. There first suggestion is that systems should embed a deliberative 
stance: individuals – wherever possible – should take up the ideal of 
deliberation and enact a form of collective practical reasoning that undergirds 
collective decision-making. The second notion is that we should move toward 
a democratic system: here deliberation is just one mechanisms that legitimates 
collective decisions alongside voting, exit, contestation, etc. (see also Warren, 
2017).  
                                                          
15 This is because the deliberative process means that minipublic participants are no longer 
representative of the public, giving the latter no reason to accept the former’s decisions. 
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Both suggestions are problematic. The notion of a deliberative stance 
misunderstands the normatively value of deliberation. Precisely because we 
have empirical evidence that some deliberative features are better suited to 
bringing about some outcomes, a breakdown in the unitary model is both 
normatively and empirically compelling. Owen and Smith (2015) might employ 
a reductio ad absurdum in which a deliberative system has no ‘real’ 
deliberation. But this point again misrepresents the nature of the deliberation: it 
was always a regulative ideal that is only able to be approached in social and 
political contexts. Working out how to approximate the ideal has always been 
the central task of deliberative democracy. This opens space for thinking about 
when a breakdown of the unitary model may be justified. The claim relating to 
democratic systems should also be rejected. Deliberative democrats qua 
deliberative democrats should hold on to the position that legitimacy is attained 
through the rational argumentation between affected individuals. Non-
deliberative modes of collective action can only be rendered acceptable through 
justification, thus giving deliberation primacy in the design, operation, and 
outcome of collective decision-making (Dryzek, 2009; Thompson, 2008). 
While it is important to specify how these meta-theoretical justifications should 
occur, this is a matter of argumentation, and not a reason to abandon deliberation 
as the motor of the systemic legitimacy.  
 
As such, deliberative democrats require an alternate way to justify the systemic 
move. I suggest the following: deliberative systems ground ethical, epistemic, 
and democratically legitimate decisions to the extent that actors and institutions 
are arranged to ensure that ‘better arguments’ win out in the process of 
collective decision-making. The notion that arguments which are expressed 
honestly, with factual and supporting reasons, while attaching to shared norms 
stands at the core of deliberative theory.16 The process of giving and taking 
arguments treats others as an ethical source of reason, sorts good epistemic 
claims from bad ones, and generates legitimacy for collective decisions through 
the inclusion of affected parties. This does not necessarily mean that there is 
always one ‘best argument’ for any given issue. Rather, that through the process 
of deliberation, weaker arguments are separated from better ones, and new 
arguments – perhaps better than those held by any individual, group, or faction 
– can be made manifest through different forms of collaborative, creative, and 
contestatory argumentation. Institutional structures in a deliberative system 
should be arranged to enable better arguments to be formed in different parts of 
the system, with binding decisions reflecting the weight of better argumentation.  
                                                          
16 There is not space in this piece to discuss, at length, what constitutes a ’better argument’ as 
there are post-modern, psychological, and post-colonial debates which question the nature of 
empirical truth, truthfulness, and moral rightness. However, I follow Habermas (1996) classic 
formulation here. In defense, I simply note that, insofar as deliberative democrats think better 
arguments can win out in the ideal speech situation, there must be better or worse forms or 
argument to be uncovered which are related to truth, sincerity, and moral norms. 
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From the Individual to the Group and on to the Polity 
 
By adopting this view of deliberative democracy, it helps make sense of the role 
of micro, meso, and macro deliberation. My argument is that pursuing 
instrumental benefits at these levels should be contingent upon whether it 
foments better arguments across the system, ultimately transposing those 
arguments into binding rules. This argument tracks other claims in the literature 
that the systemic level has priority in normative analysis, but with more 
specificity. By this, I mean that the micro-, meso-, and macro-level do not 
necessarily have priority over one another in the evaluation of how a system 
discharges its core goal. This might seem counterintuitive, but the priority is 
non-obvious. For instance, we should not sacrifice national democratization or 
popular support for citizens with a lack of knowledge or minimal civic desire 
(lest they elect poor leaders or do not participate at all). Similarly, we should 
accept polarized groups that craft well-founded arguments instead of blindly 
shifting opinions (in line with social pressure) or deferring to difference across 
divided societies (i.e. accepting the views of others with no good reason). As 
such, there is a clear systemic priority: the justifiability and design of 
deliberative systems must allow better arguments to emerge and eventually win 
out in the decisions that bind all those within the system.  
 
So how exactly does this normative aim for a deliberative systems help guide 
institutional design? Following Habermas (1996) and Dryzek (2009), the 
distinction between empowered and public spaces is crucial.17 The basic 
division of labour between these two spheres should be as follows: publics 
spheres are arranged to allow the strongest arguments on matters of common 
interest to be formed. These arguments should be then transmitted to the 
empowered space, whereby these arguments are trialled against one-another on 
equal and non-coercive terms. This trialling of argumentation in the empowered 
space then pits the best possible arguments against one-another. To give this 
framework more specificity, it is important to be clear about what normative 
distinctions turn upon each space, how actors in each space should thus operate, 
and how this relates to micro, meso, and macro deliberation.  
 
In public spaces, actors should be provided space to formulate arguments in the 
strongest possible terms. Precisely because public spheres contain a range of 
imbalances (power, epistemic, etc.) this should be considered in justifying 
institutional arrangements. Whether institutions should be coupled together or 
shielded from wider societal processes depends on how better arguments will 
be formed. If groups need to test their arguments against other claims in the 
system to strengthen their view, then interlinkage is desirable. This highlights 
the importance of systemic thinking, as deliberation may often require 
                                                          
17 In contrast to these scholars, my argument suggests that normative justification turns on 
these spaces.  
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individuals in isolated groups to be open to collaborative engagement with 
actors in other parts of the system in order to form new and better arguments. 
Alternately, if a group may be co-opted or colonized through such linkages, then 
institutional dislocation is likely required for the formation of better arguments, 
especially as actors seek to overcome historical or structural power imbalances 
emanating from other parts of the system. Through these differentiated 
processes, different publics arrive at their best arguments.  
 
In the empowered space, however, such differentiations are not normatively 
justified. Rather, we should rather demand formal equality of reason-giving in 
shaping law and policy.18 As such, while some steps (i.e. quotas) might be 
necessary to achieve formal equality, what matters is that all arguments are 
tested against each other in crafting binding rules. While there are many times 
in political life where disagreement will still exist after better arguments have 
removed some (or even many) options, this is when different forms of 
deliberative bargaining should pervade (Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, 
Estlund, Føllesdal, Fung, & Martí, 2010). By trialling the best arguments from 
different parts of the public space against one another in the empowered space 
under conditions of equality, this process allows individuals to see that their 
views are taken seriously (publicity), provides critical distance from the state to 
allow free public opinion-formation, and enables a form of ‘reasoning together’. 
 
This analysis leads to the claim that pursuing micro, meso, and macro 
instrumental benefits is conditional upon whether it helps promote the better 
argument at the systemic level. This is a tricky guideline to follow in practice, 
but it does mandate certain actions. For instance, in many cases we will think 
that individuals developing better knowledge or enhancing social learning is 
desirable. However, while we should demand this of actors in empowered 
spaces who need to learn about the views of others to appropriate subject their 
own claims to reasoned argument, this might not be desirable for individuals or 
groups in public spaces who should focus more on honing their specific claim 
rather than learning about a range of alternatives. Similarly, while polarization 
is usually considered normatively suspect,19 it is desirable when it helps groups 
overcome systemic pressures that dampen the creation of their arguments. 
Finally, we should not simply accept macro democratic systems that allow 
micro or meso deliberation to feed in to empowered spaces without asking 
whether these are the best arguments for grounding systemic legitimacy. If 
seeking micro or meso benefits are actually removing better arguments from the 
system, then we should question the justifiability of those instrumental goals. If 
two instrumental benefits stand in tension (say, between knowledge gain and 
meta-consensus during group deliberation), then working out how to make the 
                                                          
18 In both public and empowered spaces, the type of communicative act employed for reason-
giving should depend on how better arguments can fostered and trialed respectively.  
19 Though some scholars have noted that polarization which reflects the better argument 
should be fostered. 
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trade-off should be done in accordance with the systemic goal outlined here. 
Similarly, thinking about the right constitutional design or democratic structure 
(i.e. parliamentary vs. presidential) at the polity levels requires thinking about 
how better arguments can be made across the system. 
 
It is for these reasons that more knowledge about the drivers of instrumental 
benefits and their scope conditions is so important in systemic theorizing. By 
understanding how these instrumental effects work, we will be better able to 
prescribe how and when to induce certain outcomes and when to negate them. 
For instance, if a group needs to polarize to produce a strong argument, knowing 
how polarization is stymied is essential in avoiding this prescription. In this 
sense, empirical analysis is crucial in thinking about the applicability of 
normative principles.  
 
Ultimately, public spaces should be arranged to allow better arguments to 
surface. As this occurs, empowered spaces should weigh these arguments 
against one another under conditions of equality as binding rules are decided. It 
recognizes there is no priority between micro, meso, and macro levels, but rather 
sees each level as important insofar as they contribute to a system. But it does 
have implications for how we justify institutional arrangements differentially in 
empowered and public spaces. Pace Goodin and many others, it means that we 
should limit distributed deliberation to public spaces rather than empowered 
spaces because, in the end, empowered spaces must trial the best systemic 
arguments against one another to ensure better arguments win out. While 
distributed deliberation in public spaces might be useful in forming better 
arguments, it does risk segmenting arguments. Distributed deliberation in 
empowered spaces could only be justified, then, if all relevant arguments are 
tested against one-another at some point. Similarly, while polarization in public 
spaces might be good for crafting stronger arguments, it is likely problematic in 
empowered spaces as it would entail ignoring key arguments. In this way, my 
claim gives priority to the systemic level, but employs micro, meso, and macro 
deliberation in different ways depending on whether it occurs in public or 
empowered space.   
 
Novel Forms of Communication and Non-Deliberative Acts 
 
Although we need to think about how micro changes, meso alterations, and 
macro outcomes sustain a deliberative system, we should also think about how 
the systemic turn can impact analysis at those levels. Two issues stand out. The 
first is to begin using new modes of communication to think about how 
instrumental values might be attained. The second is to start using the scope 
conditions noted above to think about the design of a system in holistic terms. 
This will be especially important for the justifiability of non-deliberative acts. I 
discuss both in order. 
 
23








A major reason behind the systemic turn is that the Habermasian emphasis on 
formal reason-giving elided the importance of alternative form of 
argumentation. It is now widely agreed that narrative, rhetoric, story-telling, 
humor, art, and many other modes of expression are legitimate forms of 
argumentation. While normative theory has rightly advanced this claim, and 
scholars have begun thinking about how different communicative modes are 
used across a system, there has been very little feedback to those working on 
the instrumental benefits of deliberation. For instance, I know of almost no 
studies that attempt to systematically study how different forms of reason-
giving impact micro, meso, or macro deliberation.20 It is likely that 
preference/opinion change, knowledge gain, and civic participatory desires are 
driven by different forms of argument depending upon the individual. Likewise, 
meso and macro changes are almost certainly driven by different types of 
communication depending upon how those modes manage to tap in to, or 
disrupt, group norms. For instance, empathy is often established by finding new 
ways to understand another’s position, and popular support seems very likely 
driven by how elites ‘perform’.  
 
As such, it is imperative to take these new forms of communication and see 
whether certain micro, meso, and macro level benefits are enhanced or impeded 
by their use. This, however, is an empirical issue. And, while establishing how 
different forms of argumentation matter for instrumental benefits, their usage 
should still be determined on normative grounds: whether better arguments are 
produced across a system. Of course, this normative goal should make room for 
the fact that alternate forms of argumentation is likely intrinsically valuable as 
self-expression is a key to autonomy. But it seems plausible to me that alternate 
forms of argumentation are also crucial to the formation of better arguments as 
individuals can express themselves in ways that attach to their cultural, social, 
and psychological make-up. When we understand how micro, meso, and macro 
benefits can be achieved, then we can begin making systemic trade-offs between 
those benefits and ensuring that better arguments are produced in different 
institutional locations. 
 
A similar point can be made about the utilization and justifiability of non-
deliberative acts. While most scholars have accepted the expansion of 
communicative acts, the import of non-deliberative acts (such as protests and 
violence) has been heavily criticised. Though it is very plausible that such acts 
might eventually generate systemic benefits, a key problem remains: there is a 
very high epistemic threshold in understanding when non-deliberative acts have 
good outcomes (Fung, 2005). The social world is complex, maybe even 
stochastic. If we do make space for good deliberative outcomes based on non-
deliberative actions, then we need strong knowledge of the determinants and 
                                                          
20 One exception is the emphasis on story-telling in deliberating across difference from Steiner 
et al. (2017) and rhetoric in the acceptability of argument from Polletta and Lee (2006). 
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outcomes of different deliberative situations. For instance, it is an empirical 
argument whether non-deliberative situations (i.e. protests) enhance or 
undermine national democratization over time. To the extent we favour this 
outcome, the defence of protests over government control should be informed 
by relevant empirical evidence.  
 
Understanding what benefits micro, meso, and macro benefits bring is important 
in (at least) three ways, then. First, it helps comprehend said benefits even under 
circumstances of social complexity and thus enables the construction of more 
reliable prescriptions. Second, this information is useful insofar as – by telling 
us what deliberation produces – it will also tell us what deliberation cannot 
produce. Perhaps deliberation is good at reducing polarization when groups are 
composed of different views and a politics of presence is available, but 
deliberation is not be able to undo the effects of polarization (conceivably due 
to motivated reasoning) when such conditions are unavailable. When such 
conditions do not obtain, then, we have strong reasons to justify non-
deliberative remedies. Righting systemic wrongs through non-deliberation can 
then be informed through empirical knowledge of what deliberation cannot 
accomplish in the production of better arguments. 
 
Finally, by thinking about the use of non-deliberative acts, it also turns our 
attention toward the scope conditions of deliberation. Section II argued that 
more work is needed to think about the conditions under which instrumental 
benefits are attained at micro, meso, and macro levels. This includes issues such 
as the role of information and moderation in mini-publics, the individual 
characteristics of deliberators, the type of political system in which institutions 
are embedded, and so on. By thinking about these factors, we will know how to 
tie institutions into a system in ways that promote better arguments. Do some 
participant characteristics impede instrumental benefits? Do some 
representative systems (first-past-the-post vs. party list) alter the demands of 
government justifiability and popular support/democratization? Does linking a 
minipublic to a parliamentary body limit or promote civic participatory desire? 
Do non-deliberative acts help or hinder recognition across difference in other 
parts of the system? Thinking about these question is important. But crucially, 
thinking about these questions and asking whether it enhances or undermines 




In conclusion, deliberative democracy is now a normative theory with 
established empirical implications. We know much more about the types of 
beneficial outcomes produced by deliberation across different contexts. 
However, in several ways, this literature remains embryonic. Few studies seek 
to disaggregate deliberation in to its relevant features and assess which aspects 
are most important for obtaining different values. While studies focusing on 
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preference shifts, opinion change, knowledge gain, and (to some extent) social 
learning and popular support look at the quality of deliberation as a driver, the 
link between other beneficial outcomes and deliberative quality remains under-
studied. The scope conditions that produce these benefits – and how this gleaned 
evidence can help think about systemic designs – has only just begun.21 
 
In terms of future work, a large portion of evidence comes today from 
experimental (lab, survey, and field) designs. While the usage and utility of 
these methods should not be understated, scholars should continue to reflect 
upon issues of internal validity (whether the effects of deliberation can be 
separated from other parts of the process) and external validity (problems of 
self-selection – whether those who opt in to deliberative exercises vary in some 
significant way from the wider population they are supposed to represent).22 In 
order to mitigate these issues, qualitative scholars and practitioners, both 
separately and in collaboration, should seek to test the effects of deliberation in 
the field (improving external validity). Quantitative scholars should also seek to 
expand the range of comparative cases available to study and improve the 
operationalization of deliberation to enhance both internal and external validity. 
Likewise, several other instrumental benefits should be considered: social trust, 
emancipation, distributive justice, and epistemic correctness have all been 
purported, though studies remain scarce. 
 
 Ultimately, though, valuing deliberation for its instrumental effects is still a 
normative commitment (Thompson, 2008). While our intuitions can only be 
defeated by other intuitions, our reasons for holding these views can be 
supported by empirical evidence. In addition to whatever intrinsic reasons one 
has for being a deliberative democrat, then, we also have (some) good 
instrumental reasons to support this position. I have suggested that the ultimate 
systemic test should be whether the institutional landscape enables the 
emergence of better arguments in public spaces to be equitably trialled against 
one-another in the empowered space. This way, better arguments form binding 
decisions. This has implications for how we justify different institutional 
arrangements (such as distributed deliberation), the importance of new modes 
of communication, and the use of non-deliberative acts. But most directly, it 
suggests that the instrumental values of deliberation should be understood in 
terms of how systems produce turn better arguments in collective decisions. 
When symbiosis occurs between micro, meso, and macro deliberation and this 
systemic goal, then we should promote the instrumental aims. Where trade-offs 
emerge, however, the systemic goal must take priority. 
  
                                                          
21 Bächtiger et al. (2010) called for this type of work, though it has remained scant.  
22 Issues of autocorrelation between deliberative ideals and outcomes should also be 
considered in interpreting results.  
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